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abstraCt
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
the extent of Islamic social responsibility disclosure in Kuwait.  The annual reports of 40 
Shariah-compliant financial institutions listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange in 2010 are 
examined. Four major corporate governance characteristics are investigated: 1) the existence 
of a Shariah supervisory board; 2) the number of board members; 3) the proportion of non-
executive directors to the total number of directors on the board; and 4) role duality. 
The extent of Islamic social responsibility disclosure is measured using a self-constructed 
index. The index consists of 46 Islamic information items. Multivariate regression analyses 
are used to examine the relationships between these characteristics and the level of Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure. The results show that Shariah-compliant financial institutions 
disclosed 18% on average of the possible voluntary disclosure items. The findings report that 
Islamic social responsibility disclosure increases with the presence of a Shariah supervisory 
board, but decreases with role duality. Other corporate governance characteristics were 
found not to be significant in the study. 
Keywords: Islamic social responsibility disclosure, Shariah-compliant financial institutions, 
corporate governance characteristics, Kuwait.
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I. IntroduCtIon
Islamic (Shariah) principles of conduct  are 
different from those in Western countries. 
The resurgence of Islam as a way of life has 
therefore opened up an additional dimension 
in financial reporting. Islam has its own 
laws to regulate companies and business 
transactions, creating the need for Shariah-
compliant financial institutions. Unlike 
conventional financial institutions, they do 
not charge and collect interest (riba), which 
is strictly prohibited in Islam. Abu-Majid et 
al. (2011) pointed out that one of the main 
reasons for the establishment of Islamic 
financial institutions is the desirability of 
abolishing fixed interest rates and bringing 
the “Islamization” of financial systems. 






financial institutions in size and complexity 
since the 1970s, and their increasing presence 
in world financial markets (Sulaiman, 
2000), these institutions are deemed to have 
extremely high levels of accountability to 
protect the rights of their stakeholders (Abu-
Majid et al., 2011). This poses an important 
challenge for these institutions: to improve 
all the crucial aspects of their corporate 
governance (Chapra, 2007). The objective of 
corporate governance in Shariah-compliant 
financial institutions is primarily to increase 
accountability by broadening the scope of 
disclosure beyond a financial focus (Abu-
Majid et al., 2011). 
The annual report is used by management 
to communicate firm performance and 
governance matters to stakeholders (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Thus in discharging 
their accountability duties, these institutions 
should specifically disclose Islamic social 
responsibility information in their annual 
reports. This is to enable stakeholders to 
exercise prudence from both economic 
and Islamic jurisprudence perspectives. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2002) suggested 
that full disclosure in the annual report of 
relevant and reliable information would 
assist Muslim stakeholders in making both 
economic and religious decisions and assist 
managers in fulfilling their accountability to 
God and society.
The impact of corporate governance 
characteristics on the level of voluntary 
social disclosure has generated an increasing 
amount of attention in recent years. The 
focus of much of the research on this 
issue has been on conventional financial 
institutions. However, very little has been 
written about corporate governance and 
its impact on Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure in Shariah-compliant financial 
companies. To date, no study has examined 
this issue in Kuwait. 
Unlike East Asia countries such as Malaysia, 
in which Islamic regulations exist and a 
corporate governance code is in place, Kuwait 
is in the early stages of issuing a corporate 
governance code and Islamic practices. 
This study fills the gap in empirical studies 
on the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics on disclosure practices of 
Shariah-compliant financial companies’ 
in Kuwait. Therefore, the purpose of this 
study is to investigate the extent of Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure in the annual 
reports of these financial companies and to 
explain why some disclose more than others 
do.
This study is important because it enhances 
understanding of corporate governance 
structures and Islamic social responsibility 
disclosures in Shariah-compliant financial 
institutions. Specifically, it seeks to 
understand the effect of corporate 
governance on voluntary disclosure, and 
why some companies disclose more Islamic 
information than others.  This is given the 
absence of a corporate governance code 
or any Islamic regulations forcing such 
companies to disclose such information. 
The study also explores the determinants 
of corporate governance that help explain 
voluntary Islamic disclosure. This may be 
useful for lawmakers, Shariah supervisory 
boards, preparers of financial statements, and 
existing and potential investors (Muslim and 
non-Muslim). The Capital Market Authority 






findings to suggest areas where efforts to 
improve the disclosure regulatory practices 
by Shariah-compliant financial companies 
should be concentrated. The CMA may also 
use this information to evaluate the current 
corporate governance requirements and their 
effects on disclosure. Given the importance 
of Shariah-compliant financial companies 
in Kuwait, the CMA should be particularly 
concerned with issues related to specific 
disclosure of Islamic information. 
Furthermore, it may be useful for Shariah 
supervisory boards in communicating 
with stakeholders. This may assist in 
strengthening Shariah supervisory boards. 
This information is also useful when the 
preparers of financial statements strive to 
communicate with Muslim shareholders 
and investors. Stakeholders, e.g. Muslim 
investors, may consult the findings to better 
understand Shariah-compliant financial 
companies in Kuwait when diversifying 
their Islamic investment portfolios.
The remainder of the study is organized as 
follows. The CMA is described in Section II. 
Corporate governance of Shariah-compliant 
financial institutions in Kuwait is discussed 
in Section III. The relevant literature 
review is discussed in Section IV. Study 
hypotheses are put forth in Section V. How 
the sample was selected, the data collection 
methods, and how the statistical analysis 
was performed are presented in Section VI. 
The results are described and interpreted in 
Section VII. Conclusion, limitations, and 
suggestions on how the research could be 
extended are put forth in the final Section 
VIII.
II. the CapItal marKet 
     authorIty
This section discusses the establishment and 
role of the CMA in regulating and monitoring 
Shariah-compliant financial companies. As 
background information, Kuwait is one of 
the Middle Eastern Muslim countries that 
first realized the need for companies to 
comply with Shariah rules and principles. 
Consequently, the Kuwait Finance House 
became a pioneering company in Islamic 
finance as a Shariah-compliant financial 
institution. It was established in Kuwait in 
1977 and provides a wide range of Shariah-
compliant products and services (Kuwait 
Finance House, 2012). 
The number of companies claiming to 
comply with Shariah rules and principles 
has since increased to 40 as of December 31, 
2010, which represents 65% of all financial 
companies listed on the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange (KSE). These companies also 
represent 67% of total market capitalization 
of the financial companies listed on the KSE 
(KSE, 2010). It confirms the importance 
of these companies as a component of the 
overall capital market. This could also 
reflect the needs or preferences of investors 
for such companies.
Until the establishment of the CMA in 
Kuwait in 2010, there was no authority to 
ensure that companies’ transactions and 
activities were based on Shariah rules and 
principles. A number of financial companies 
claiming to comply with Shariah law 
voluntarily appointed a Shariah supervisory 
board of Islamic scholars to verify their 






divergence of interests between Muslim 
decision makers and management. 
In February 2010, the Ministries Council 
issued law No. 7 of 2010 establishing 
the CMA. The Executive Regulations of 
Law No. 7 of 2010 include 15 articles 
establishing the Shariah Advisory Council 
(SAC). The law states that the Council 
is the reference in all decisions of the 
CMA relating to activities consistent with 
Shariah rules and principles. The SAC 
consists of at least five members, including 
experts in the jurisprudence of Islamic 
financial transactions, law, economics, and 
administrative sciences, with the majority 
being specialists in Shariah (CMA, 2010). 
The stated aims of the SAC are to:
1) Function as a reference for the activities 
of companies licensed to work in 
compliance with Shariah rules and 
principles;
2) Ensure the supervisory departments of 
the CMA comply with Shariah rules 
and principles in their supervision of 
Shariah companies; 
3) Advise the CMA on products and new 
Islamic financial instruments in the 
capital market;
4) Advise the CMA on complaints from 
Muslim decision makers regarding 
their companies’ non-compliance with 
Shariah rules and principles;
5) Propose a Shariah index (of Shariah-
compliant companies listed on the KSE) 
to the CMA.
The law defines Shariah-compliant 
companies as those whose business 
transactions and activities are in compliance 
with Shariah rules and principles. It 
also gives the SAC the right to classify 
companies listed on the KSE as compliant 
or non-compliant, based on whether their 
activities are in compliance. Non-compliant 
companies are those whose activities are 
in contravention of Shariah rules and 
principles (CMA, 2010). For example, 
non-compliant business transactions and 
activities include charging interest (riba), 
gambling (maysir/gimar), speculation and 
ambiguity (gharar) , and manufacture or sale 
of prohibited or related products or services, 
such as alcoholic drinks, pork, and unlawful 
entertainment (Maali et al., 2006).
III. Corporate 
       GovernanCe oF 
       sharIah-ComplIant 
       FInanCIal 
       InsItutIons In 
       KuwaIt
This section describes current corporate 
governance that exists in Kuwait. To date, 
there is no national corporate governance 
code. However, two governmental bodies 
are concerned with defining and enforcing 
principles of corporate governance: the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the 
KSE. All types of companies (Shariah or non 
Shariah) must comply with these principles 
that stress protecting stakeholders and users 
of financial reporting. 
The Ministry promulgated a number of 
corporate governance principles in Company 
Law No. 15 (CL15) of 1960. It contains 
12 provisions on corporate governance 
practices. These include election of boards 
of directors and their terms in office, board 
vacancies, the minimum number of board 
meetings in the fiscal year, and the liability of 
the board to the company and shareholders. 






three directors, with no maximum, with 
renewable terms of not more than three 
years. CL15 allows directors to hold office 
concurrently with any other office in the 
company, but does not specify the balance 
between executive and non-executive 
directors. In terms of board structure based 
on this role duality, the same individual may 
function as chairman of the board and chief 
executive officers (CEO).
The KSE issued the Amiri Decree (Stock 
Exchange Law) on August 14, 1983 and 
includes only two corporate governance 
principles. It is silent on all the CL15 
provisions, requiring only that board 
members inform the stock exchange 
administration of how many shares they 
own within one month of being appointed 
to the board. However, this information 
is not published and only the exchange is 
informed. The decree also stipulates that 
board members may not have any direct or 
indirect interest in contracts and transactions 
with or for the company unless they have 
been granted authorization from the general 
meeting. 
These CL15 provisions and KSE decree 
principles have not been amended since 
their issuance. Moreover, the Kuwait Central 
Bank (KCB) is silent in any corporate 
governance principles. However, with 
the absence of formal Islamic corporate 
governance in Kuwait, Shariah-compliant 
financial institutions have voluntarily used 
the recommendations of the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
institutions (AAOIFI). It was established in 
1990 and is supported by 200 institutional 
members from 45 countries. The aims of the 
AAOIFI are to prepare accounting, auditing, 
governance, ethics and Shariah standards for 
Islamic financial institutions. To date, the 
AAOIFI has issued 25 accounting standards, 
five auditing standards, two codes of ethics, 
and seven governance standards (AAOIFI, 
2012). Although Shariah-compliant 
financial institutions in Kuwait have not 
formally adopted AAOIFI standards, they 
may voluntarily use a number of them such 
as creation of a Shariah supervisory board in 
Islamic companies.
Iv. lIterature revIew
In many countries, religious beliefs are 
a private issue, influencing every aspect 
of life including spirituality, business, 
and social justice (Rice, 1999). Islam is a 
religion that affects the way Muslims live 
and do business (Graafland et al., 2006; 
Sulaiman, 2001). Islam’s influence on 
business, especially accounting, is evident 
(Beekun, 1997; Karim, 1995; Ullah and 
Jamali, 2010; Wilson, 2006). From an 
accounting perspective, Islam influences 
financial disclosure practices (Baydoun and 
Willett, 1997; Willett and Sulaiman, 2001; 
Ullah and Jamali, 2010). 
The Islamic perspective on disclosure 
consists of two requirements: (1) full 
disclosure and (2) social accountability 
(Baydoun and Willet, 2000; Haniffa, 2002). 
The concept of social accountability relates 
to the principle of full disclosure with 
the objective of serving Islamic society 
(Baydoun and Willet, 2000). Unity with 
God is a foundational Islamic concept. God 
has absolute ownership; human beings are 
merely trustees in this world (Maali et al., 
2006). As trustees, all people are responsible 
to God and for Islamic society, and will be 
accountable for their actions in an afterlife 






to the spiritual needs of Muslim decision 
makers. 
Despite the growth of Shariah-compliant 
financial companies in both size and 
complexity, few studies have examined 
voluntary Islamic disclosures in the 
context of these companies. Although 
some studies since 1986 have investigated 
Islamic accounting and corporate reporting 
of Shariah-compliant companies, they 
are generally normative or analytical, 
developing theoretical frameworks for 
Islamic accounting.  They lack systemic, 
empirical analyses of corporate Islamic 
disclosure practices. 
A seminal study by Gambling and Karim 
(1986) developed a theoretical foundation 
for analyzing Islamic accounting and its 
peculiarities: examining social orientation. 
Following them, Hamid et al. (1993) 
and Karim (1995) developed conceptual 
frameworks for Islamic accounting and 
disclosure requirements by investigating 
the influence of Islam on all areas of 
accounting, from practice to disclosure. 
Sadeqhzadeh (1995) developed a theoretical 
framework for the Islamic perspective of 
social responsibilities, and contrasted it with 
conventional theories related to the area. 
Baydoun and Willett (2000) subsequently 
developed normative Islamic reporting as 
value added statements based on Islamic 
values, following the two principles of full 
disclosure and social disclosure. 
Empirical studies investigating voluntary 
corporate disclosure by Shariah-compliant 
companies can be divided into two groups. 
The first includes studies with a measure of 
disclosure that is not an index. Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2007) measured the level of ethical 
2006). Under Islam, people’s accountability 
includes societal accountability. 
In Islamic accounting, management and 
shareholders are accountable for their 
actions to all stakeholders, and to society 
and the public (Baydoun and Willett, 1997). 
Society has the right to know the operational 
effects of a company on its well-being, 
and to be advised within the requirements 
of Shariah whether the objectives were 
achieved (Baydoun and Willet, 2000). One 
of the ways that companies do this is by 
providing full disclosure to help discharge 
their accountability to society. Baydoun and 
Willett (2000) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2002) 
suggest that full disclosure means relevant 
and reliable information of importance about 
companies discharging their accountability 
to God, society and Muslim decision 
makers in making economic and religious 
decisions.
Islamic social reporting is an extension 
of reporting that encompasses not only 
conventional disclosure related to the 
broader expectations of society with regard 
to a company’s role in the economy, but 
also a spiritual perspective (Haniffa, 2002). 
The objectives of Islamic social reporting 
show whether the company is compliant 
with Shariah principles and how operations 
affect the well-being of society pertaining 
to interest and unfair trading practices. 
They also enable Muslim decision makers 
to perform their religious duties (Maali 
et al., 2006; Sulaiman, 2001). Haniffa 
(2002) suggests Islamic social reporting 
is necessary in an Islamic society with the 
objectives of demonstrating accountability 
to God and society.  This includes increasing 
transparency of business activities by 






identity of seven Islamic banks’ annual 
reports in six Gulf countries (Kuwait, Qatar, 
Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates). Based on an ideal 
versus the communicated ethical identity 
framework, they reported a wide gap 
between the two. Eight dimensions of ethical 
identity were used: (1) mission and vision 
statement, (2) board of directors and top 
management, (3) products and services, (4) 
Zakah - charity and benevolent funds (qard 
hasan), (5) commitments to employees, (6) 
commitment to debtors, (7) commitment to 
society, and (8) Shariah supervisory board.
The second group includes studies with 
a measure of voluntary disclosure that 
is a self-constructed index. Maali et al. 
(2006) examined voluntary Islamic social 
disclosure in 29 Islamic banks in 16 
countries (including one Kuwaiti bank). 
A disclosure index consisting of 30 items 
measured the level of voluntary Islamic 
social disclosure. Findings suggest that the 
overall mean Islamic social disclosure index 
for the highest bank was 35% and the lowest 
was 0%, indicating that two banks did not 
disclose any Islamic information. The 
authors concluded that disclosure of Islamic 
social reporting falls short of expectations. 
Islamic banks may only disclose corporate 
social reporting information to construct 
an Islamic reality while not subscribing to 
that reality and its resultant obligations. 
However, the authors did not attempt to 
investigate variations of Islamic disclosure 
among the sample banks. 
Hassan and Harahap (2010) explored 
whether any discrepancy existed between 
the corporate social activities disclosed 
in annual reports of Islamic banks and a 
corporate social responsibility disclosure 
index for the Islamic business ethics 
framework. They developed a disclosure 
index including 78 items. The study 
described a survey of 2006 annual reports 
of seven Islamic banks from seven countries 
(Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates).  They used content analysis to 
measure the volume of social responsibility 
disclosure. The results demonstrated that the 
overall mean social responsibility disclosure 
index for the highest bank was 61% and the 
lowest was 14%. Therefore, issues of social 
responsibility disclosure are not a major 
concern for most Islamic banks. This study 
did not attempt to examine why some banks 
disclosed more Islamic information than 
others. 
Halil et al., (2011) investigated the 
level of compliance with Shariah, social 
responsibilities and corporate governance 
disclosures by a sample of 17 Islamic 
banks in Malaysia. Their Shariah disclosure 
index consists of 11 information items 
whereas the social responsibilities 
disclosure index contains 13 items. Their 
corporate governance disclosure index 
has 16 items. The findings reported that 
the level of compliance with Shariah and 
social responsibilities disclosures was 94%. 
The level of compliance with corporate 
governance disclosure was 91%. The 
findings also reported that the size of Islamic 
banks (measured by paid-up capital) affected 
only Shariah and social responsibilities 
disclosures. 
Sulaiman et al. (2011) attempted to measure 
the extent of compliance with Shariah 
disclosure by a sample of 16 Islamic financial 
institutions in Malaysia. A disclosure index 
consisting of 123 items was developed 






Bank of Malaysia (BNM), the standard on 
corporate governance promulgated by the 
AAOIFI, and the framework introduced by 
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). 
The results reported that the disclosure index 
ranges from a low of 42% to a high of 68%, 
with the average score 51%. 
Zubairu et al. (2011) measure the extent of 
Islamic social disclosure by a sample of 4 
Saudi Islamic banks for 2008 to 2009. They 
adopted the Haniffa and Hudain (2007) and 
Maali et al. (2003) checklists to measure 
the social disclosure of the 4 banks. Their 
checklist consists of 80 information items. 
They found that Saudi Islamic banks 
disclosed less than 50% of the items and 
concluded that these banks had poor Islamic 
disclosure, yet claimed to be in compliance 
with Shariah principles. 
Farook et al. (2011) attempted to develop and 
test a theoretical model of the determinants 
of Islamic banks’ social disclosures. They 
examined the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and the level 
of Islamic social disclosure in 47 Islamic 
banks in 14 countries (5 banks from Kuwait) 
for 2002 and 2003. The Islamic social 
disclosure items were collected mainly 
from the annual reports. The corporate 
governance characteristics examined were 
the existence of a Shariah supervisory 
board, number of board directors, and role 
duality. Company size as a control variable 
was also investigated. Regression analysis 
was used to test this relationship. The study 
reported that the mean of Islamic social 
responsibility disclosure by Islamic banks 
was 17%. The maximum level of Islamic 
social disclosure was 48%, and the minimum 
was 0%. According to the regression results, 
the variation in the level of Islamic social 
disclosure was explained by all corporate 
governance variables. However, company 
size is the only insignificant variable.
 
This brief review of the relevant literature 
demonstrates that studies measuring 
the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics on voluntary Islamic 
disclosure are scarce and limited. To date, 
no study has attempted to investigate the 
association between corporate governance 
characteristics and voluntary Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure by Shariah-
compliant financial companies in Kuwait. 
v. hypotheses
Prior studies have reported that a number 
of corporate governance characteristics 
may influence a company’s disclosure 
of voluntary information in general and 
Islamic information items in particular. In 
the present study, each corporate governance 
characteristic had to meet four preconditions 
before it was included. First, there had to be 
a sound, theoretical reason for expecting the 
characteristic to be associated with voluntary 
Islamic social responsibility disclosure. 
Second, the characteristic must be relevant to 
the socioeconomic environment of Kuwait. 
Third, the characteristic must be measurable 
in principle. Finally, sufficient data must be 
available in the Shariah-compliant financial 
companies’ annual reports or guides available 
from stock exchanges for the characteristic 
to be measured in practice.
Based on these preconditions, four corporate 
governance characteristics were selected for 
this study: (1) the existence of a Shariah 






board members, (3) the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board, and (4) 
role duality. 
Existence of Shariah supervisory board
The Shariah supervisory board is an Islamic 
governance variable that explains voluntary 
Islamic disclosure (Farook et al., 2011; Halil 
et al., 2011). Unlike Malaysia and Brunei 
where a Shariah Advisory board were 
mandatory (Halil et al., 2011), only some 
Shariah-compliant financial companies in 
Kuwait appoint Shariah supervisory boards. 
These boards monitor transactions and 
activities and limit the divergence of interests 
between Muslim decision makers and 
management. Although it is not mandatory 
for a Shariah-compliant company to have its 
own board, a company’s board of directors 
appoints the Shariah board to ensure Muslim 
decision makers are compliant with Shariah 
principles to meet their spiritual needs. 
Generally, a board consists of top Islamic 
scholars specialized in Islamic jurisprudence 
and experts in Islamic finance practices 
consistent with the AAOIFI recommendations 
(AAOIFI, 2012). Halil et al. (2011) argued 
that the common backgrounds of board’s 
members facilitate their communication and 
enable them to transform their knowledge 
faster than members of the board of directors. 
Demand for the services of such boards 
arises from the need to check accounting 
constantly against Shariah principles. 
The board investigates to what extent the 
company adheres to Shariah principles in 
all activities. The investigations include 
examination of a company’s memoranda, 
articles of association, contracts, financial 
reports, and various other reports. The 
board prepares a special report regarding the 
results of its investigation that is published 
with the annual report. However, since the 
appointment of this board is voluntary, 
a number of companies instead write a 
declaration in their annual reports claiming 
that they comply with Shariah principles.
Karim (1990) suggested that the purpose of 
a Shariah supervisory board was to ensure 
compliance with Shariah principles and 
might play a role in mandating or promoting 
voluntary Islamic disclosure by Shariah-
compliant financial companies in their 
annual reports. Halil et al. (2011) argued that 
the existence of a Shariah supervisory board 
brings transparency, trust, ethical behaviour, 
and credibility values to the companies. 
Since Shariah-compliant financial companies 
appoint Shariah supervisory boards to satisfy 
Muslim stakeholders and fulfill their values 
and spiritual needs, the presence of a board 
is likely to encourage a company to engage 
in voluntary Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure in their annual reports. This is to 
assure stakeholders that they are monitoring 
transactions and activities and constantly 
checking whether accounting practices 
are in compliance with Shariah law and 
principles. As a result, one expects the 
existence of a Shariah supervisory board 
to promote the Islamic perspective of full 
disclosure and social accountability. Thus, it 
is hypothesized that:
H1:  Shariah-compliant financial companies 
with a Shariah supervisory board are more 
likely to have a higher level of voluntary 
Islamic social responsibility disclosure. 
Number of board members
The number of board members is a significant 
corporate governance variable in explaining 
voluntary disclosure in prior studies. Haniffa 






in the number of directors could lead to 
higher voluntary disclosure because capacity 
for monitoring increases and agency costs 
decrease. Farook et al. (2011) indicated that 
a greater number of board members imply 
a greater level of compliance with Shariah 
principles since the board is able to allocate 
its monitoring functions across a larger 
number of directors. This allows the board 
to better control the opportunistic behavior 
of management and review more aspects of 
the financial companies’ activities to ensure 
compliance with the Islamic perspective of 
full disclosure and social accountability. 
In Kuwait, CL15 specifies that each 
company must have a minimum of three 
directors, with no maximum. It can be 
argued that a board with a greater number 
of directors may be more likely to enhance 
the monitoring of activities, transparency, 
and compliance with Shariah principles. 
This should increase the level of Islamic 
disclosure to assure Muslim shareholders 
and society that the company’s activities are 
in compliance with Shariah principles and 
the Islamic perspective of full disclosure 
and social accountability. Based on these 
assumptions, the following hypothesis is 
examined:
H2: Shariah-compliant financial 
companies with a greater number of 
board members are more likely to have a 
higher level of voluntary Islamic social 
responsibility disclosure. 
Proportion of non-executive board 
members
The proportion of non-executives to 
the total number of board members is a 
significant variable in explaining voluntary 
disclosure in previous studies. Weir and 
Laing (2001) and Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan (2010) indicated that boards include 
executive (insider) and non-executive 
(outsider) directors. The former are full-
time employees of the company with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities for day-
to-day operations, whereas non-executive 
directors are not affiliated with the company 
in any way. 
A larger proportion of non-executive 
members may enhance both the board’s 
effectiveness and compliance with Shariah 
principles and help to alleviate the agency 
problem by monitoring and controlling 
the opportunistic behavior of management 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1990). Consequently, companies 
are expected to voluntarily disclose more 
information (Leftwich et al., 1981; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Ho and Wong, 2001). One can 
argue that non-executive directors provide 
the necessary checks to enhance board 
effectiveness and monitoring of financial 
disclosure quality to ensure compliance 
with Shariah principles. This is because they 
are less tied to management and thus may 
encourage companies to disclose Islamic 
information to Muslim shareholders to fulfill 
their spiritual needs. On the other hand, 
Leftwich et al. (1981) suggested that when 
executive managers dominate the board, 
control becomes ineffective and collusion 
can occur between executive directors and 
management to further their own interests. 
The result may be that withholding of 
information may increase. 
In Kuwait, CL15 left it up to the board to 
determine the proportion of non-executive 
directors, as there is no regulation governing 
this. It can be argued that a board with a 






may be more likely to enhance monitoring 
and ensure compliance with Shariah 
principles. This should lead the company to 
operate from the Islamic perspective of full 
disclosure and social accountability.  This 
should also increase the level of Islamic 
disclosure to assure Muslim shareholders 
and the public that the company’s activities 
are in compliance with Shariah principles. 
Based on these assumptions, the following 
hypothesis is examined:
H3: Shariah-compliant financial 
companies with a higher proportion of 
non-executive members are more likely to 
have a higher level of voluntary Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure. 
Role duality
With role duality, a single individual serves 
as both the chief executive officer (CEO) 
and chairman of the board, creating a 
unified leadership structure. According to 
agency theory, the combined functions can 
significantly impair the board’s monitoring, 
disciplining, and compensating of senior 
mangers (Molz, 1988). It also enables the 
CEO to engage in opportunistic behavior 
because of his/her dominance over the 
board. Individuals who hold both roles are 
aligned more with management than with 
shareholders. Hence they tend to withhold 
unfavorable information in general and 
Islamic disclosure in particular from 
shareholders (Farook et al., 2011). It can 
be argued that a dominant personality in 
both roles poses a threat to monitoring and 
compliance with Shariah principles and 
therefore is detrimental to disclosure.
In Kuwait, since CL15 allows role duality, 
a number of Shariah-compliant financial 
companies are managed by one individual 
with two positions. It can be expected these 
companies with role duality are more likely 
to disclose less Islamic information in 
their annual reports. This is because their 
managers may tend to withhold information 
from shareholders in order to serve their 
own interests. As a consequence, role duality 
is more likely to impair accountability. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that: 
H4: Shariah-compliant financial 
companies that appoint a dominant CEO 
as board chairman are more likely to have 
a lower level of voluntary Islamic social 
responsibility disclosure. 
Control variables
Prior studies have documented the influence 
of company-specific characteristics on 
voluntary disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ho and Wong. 2001; Leung 
and Horwitz, 2004; Al-Shammari, 2008; 
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Farook 
et al., 2011). Four company-specific 
characteristics (company size, profitability, 
ownership structure and auditor type) were 
included in the regression model to control 
for other potential influences of voluntary 
disclosure. Most prior corporate governance 
studies have included these variables as 
control variables (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Ho and Wong, 
2001; Luo et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009 Al-Shammari 
and Al-Sultan, 2010; Farook, et al., 2011). 
Agency theory suggests that agency costs 
are associated with the separation of 
management from ownership, which are 
likely to be greater in large companies (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Larger companies are 
more politically visible than smaller ones 






price controls, threat of nationalization, and 
social responsibility requirements. These 
companies have an incentive to disclose 
more information in their annual reports 
than smaller companies to enhance their 
reputations and public image and to lessen 
public criticism or the threat of government 
intervention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
For example, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 
(2010) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
have found a positive association between 
company size and voluntary disclosure. 
Based on the Islamic perspective of social 
accountability and full disclosure, larger 
companies are more likely to become 
involved with society. They therefore 
disclose more information in their annual 
reports to discharge their accountability 
to their stakeholders, particularly Muslim 
stakeholders. In Kuwait, a number of larger 
companies have contributed to society by 
building hospitals, parks, and roads or by 
providing hospitals with equipment. It can 
be argued that from the Islamic perspective, 
Shariah-compliant financial companies may 
disclose more information about how they 
are meeting their perceived responsibilities 
to society to enhance their public image and 
reduce political costs.
Agency theory suggests that managers of 
larger profitable companies may wish to 
disclose more information to obtain personal 
advantages, like continuation of their 
management positions and compensation 
(Inchausti, 1997). Applying signaling 
theory (Ackerlof, 1970), larger profitable 
companies may disclose more information 
than less profitable companies because 
their managers are more likely to wish to 
signal their success and strength to potential 
investors and market participants (Singhvi 
and Desai, 1971; Inchausti, 1997).  For 
example, prior studies (Haniffa and Cooke; 
2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Akhtaruddin et 
al.; 2009) reported a positive relationship 
between profitability and voluntary 
disclosure. Based on the Islamic perspective 
of social accountability and full disclosure, 
a company should be willing to provide full 
disclosure regardless of whether it is making 
a profit. This is because management is 
accountable for its actions to all stakeholders, 
and to society and the public (Baydoun and 
Willett, 1997; Haniffa, 2002).
Agency theory also suggests that companies 
with more outside ownership are more likely 
to disclose more information than companies 
with less outside ownership. This is because 
when there are more outsiders, the demand 
for publicly available information is likely 
to increase. Detailed disclosure in annual 
reports may enable outsiders to monitor 
their interests more efficiently, thereby 
reducing agency costs (Leftwich et al., 
1981; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Makhija and 
Patton, 2004). Previous studies found that 
outside ownership structure was positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Akhtaruddin et 
al., 2009)
Based on the Islamic perspective of full 
disclosure and social accountability, 
management and shareholders are 
accountable for their actions to all 
stakeholders, and to society and the public. 
Society has the right to understand a 
company’s operational effects on its well-
being and to know whether the company 
is compliant with Shariah principles 
irrespective of the proportion of outside 
ownership. Full disclosure by companies 






society with detailed information, thereby 
enabling companies to demonstrate their 
accountability to society. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that large 
audit firms act as a mechanism to reduce 
agency costs and exert more of a monitoring 
role by limiting opportunistic behavior by 
managers. They argued that larger audit firms 
are less likely to be associated with clients 
that disclose lower levels of information in 
their annual reports. For instance, Luo et 
al. (2006) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
found a positive relationship between auditor 
type and voluntary disclosure. Based on the 
Islamic perspective, accountability includes 
societal accountability. Consequently, larger 
audit firms are more likely to act responsibly 
toward shareholders and society by exerting 
more of a monitoring role to uncover 
any opportunistic behavior by managers. 
Therefore, larger audit firms are more likely 
to encourage their Shariah-compliant clients 
to provide full disclosure to enable them 
to discharge their accountability to God 
and society and to enable Muslim decision 
makers in their economic and religious 
decisions.
VI. DATA COLLECTION 
 AND RESEARCH 
     METHODOLOGY
This section describes the research methods 
of the study, including sample description, 
data collection, how the dependent and 
independent variables are operationalized, 
and the analyses used to test the four 
hypotheses.
Sample and data collection
At the time of data collection, there was 
no authority to identify Shariah-compliant 
companies in Kuwait. (As of January 1, 
2012, Shariah-compliant companies are now 
identified by the SAC of the CMA.) This 
study selected all the Shariah-compliant 
financial companies listed on the KSE 
because they are the largest companies and 
are expected to be more accountable in terms 
of reporting their activities in conformance 
with Shariah rules and principles. Using 
large companies is supported by prior studies 
(Maali et al., 2006; Hassan and Harahap, 
2010; Othman and Thani, 2010). Since 
there was no authority identifying Shariah-
compliant financial companies at the time of 
data collection, it was decided to collect all 
financial companies’ annual reports and read 
them in their entirety to identify whether 
or not the companies were in compliance 
with Shariah. A company was considered in 
compliance with Shariah if it has a Shariah 
supervisory board or it publishes a statement 
in the annual report that it complies with 
Shariah rules and principles.
The 2010 Companies Guide published by 
the KSE revealed that as of December 31, 
2010, 198 companies were listed on the 
KSE. Only sixty-six financial companies 
were listed on the KSE. Based on KSE 
classifications, these companies are from 
two sectors: banking and investment and 
finance sectors. The Companies Guide was 
consulted to obtain the Web addresses of 
the 66 financial companies. Search engines 
(www.google.com and www.yahoo.com) 
were also used if addresses were not available 
from the Companies Guide. Fifty-three 
companies’ annual reports were collected 
from their homepages. For the remaining 
13 companies, the Companies Guide was 
consulted to obtain the names and addresses 
of the general managers or chief executive 






version of the 2010 annual reports was 
addressed to the general manager or CEO of 
each of the 13 remaining companies. After 
follow-up letters were sent, nine companies 
responded to the request for their annual 
reports. This may reflect the willingness of 
Kuwaiti companies to supply their annual 
reports to non-shareholders.
Overall, 62 annual reports were collected. 
After reading all annual reports, it was 
revealed that 40 companies (65%) were 
Shariah compliant. The sample consists 
of 4 Shariah-compliant banks and 36 
Shariah-compliant investment and finance 
companies. Twenty-two companies had a 
Shariah supervisory board (55%), whereas 
the remaining 18 companies (45%) only 
reported that they were in compliance with 
Shariah law. The 2010 annual reports were 
selected because they were the most recent 
available for the listed companies at the start 
of the study. 
The dependent variable
The level of Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure is measured by a disclosure 
index, which is the dependent variable. A 
properly constructed disclosure index is 
seen as a reliable measurement device for 
corporate disclosure (Marston and Shrives, 
1991). Consequently, it has been used by 
prior Shariah disclosure studies (Halil et al. 
2011; Sulaiman, et al. 2011; Farook et al., 
2011; Hassan and Harahap, 2010). 
The initial step in constructing the index was 
to develop an Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure checklist. Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2002) argued that information disclosure 
should assist Muslim decision makers in 
making religious decisions. An extensive 
review of prior studies was undertaken 
to develop a list of relevant Islamic 
information items that should be disclosed 
by Shariah-compliant financial institutions. 
For an item to be included, it must have 
been used in previous studies. However, 
only a few empirical studies were found 
on the development and use of a disclosure 
index with Islamic disclosure (Maali et 
al., 2006; Othamn et al., 2009; Hassan and 
Harahap, 2010; Halil et al., 2011; Zubairu et 
al. 2011, Farook et al., 2011). These studies 
also partially rely on the AAOIFI standards 
for developing the disclosure index. Two 
academics specializing in the area of 
disclosure and financial reporting refined 
the checklist to ensure its validity. The final 
checklist instrument consisted of 46 Islamic 
disclosure items. The checklist is described 
in the appendix.
The Islamic social responsibility disclosure 
consists of five themes as follows:
1) Social responsibility
This category contains information items 
about prohibited activities, zakat and 
charity (sadaqah), waqf, current value 
balance sheets, value added statements, 
and other social activity information 
items. Specifically, zakat is an obligation 
of individuals and businesses and one of 
the pillars of Islam: an annual tax based 
on wealth. Zakat is obligatory only for 
individuals; Shariah-compliant companies 
are not obligated to pay zakat on behalf of 
shareholders. However, in Kuwait, many 
Shariah-compliant financial companies 
do pay it on behalf of their shareholders. 
Therefore, such companies should disclose 
in the annual report the sources and uses 
of the zakat. They should also disclose any 
balance of the zakat fund not yet distributed, 






Unlike zakat, charity (sadaqah) is 
voluntary and encouraged by Islam. Waqf 
is an inalienable religious endowment in 
Shariah law, typically denoting a building 
or plot of land for Muslim religious or 
charitable purposes (Maali et al., 2006). A 
company may donate waqf, and therefore it 
should disclose qualitative and qualitative 
information related to the Waqf in its annual 
report.
In Islam, accountability includes 
accountability to the society. Thus, disclosure 
of qualitative and quantitative information 
related to charitable activities could enable 
Muslim decision makers understand the 
company’s contribution to the society. This 
is because both the management and the 
shareholders are accountable for their actions 
to all the stakeholders of the company. 
Shariah-compliant companies should not 
engage in activities that violate Shariah 
rules, such as charging interest (riba). 
Therefore, companies must disclose these 
activities. Such information could enable 
the users to understand how the operations 
of the company have affected the well-being 
of the society in terms of interest (riba) and 
prohibited practices. It also enables Muslim 
decision makers to perform their religious 
duties.
2) Employee information
Social justice is emphasized in Islam. 
Accordingly, employees must be dealt 
with justly. Muslim decision makers need 
to know if the company deals justly with 
its employees (Othman and Thani, 2010). 
Therefore, exploitation and discrimination 
are prohibited by Shariah rules and 
principles (Maali et al., 2006). Information 
related to salaries, nature of work, working 
hours, and holidays leads to social justice. 
Moreover, education and training are 
essential because of Islam’s emphasis on the 
search for knowledge (Othman and Thani, 
2010). Disclosure of such information could 
enable users to know whether the company 
violates social justice for employees as 
described in the Shariah rules and principles 
(Haniffa, 2002).
3) Environment
This category contains information regarding 
environmental protection programs or 
activities undertaken. Shariah-compliant 
companies are expected to disclose 
information about programs and activities 
undertaken to discharge their accountability 
and transparency to society (Ousama and 
Fatima, 2010). Disclosure of this information 
could assist users in determining whether 
company activities have an impact on the 
environment, and, if so, how the company 
deals with protecting the environment.
4) Corporate governance
This category contains information about 
the reports of the board of directors and 
the Shariah supervisory board. Shariah-
compliant companies should declare their 
compliance with the Shariah rules in the 
report of board of directors. In addition, 
the board should also explain the reasons 
and nature of any prohibited transactions 
undertaken, along with the revenues and 
expenses related to such transactions. 
Moreover, the board of directors must 
provide information on forbidden activities 
such as monopolistic practices, price 
manipulation, gambling, and fraudulent 
business practices (Sulaiman, 2005).  
Truth is a very important issue in the Islam 
context and it applied not only to individuals 






to fairness, which is stressed in Islam 
(Obaidullah, 2001). Fairness means all 
individuals and businesses are entitled to 
equality of opportunity, whereby all parties 
are entitled to equal access to information 
relevant to asset valuation (Obaidullah, 
2001). Thus, Shariah-compliant companies 
should disclose such activities to enable 
Muslim decision makers to understand 
the company’s activities and the reasons 
for such activities. Such disclosures could 
affect Muslim investment decisions in such 
companies. 
Disclosure of information about the Shariah 
supervisory board is important for Muslim 
decision makers because this board ensures 
the company is in compliance with the 
Shariah rules and principles (Abdullah et 
al., 2011). The Shariah supervisory board 
issues a report containing its reviewing and 
monitoring results. Specifically, the report 
of the board shows whether the company 
is in compliance and whether the company 
undertakes prohibited transactions. The report 
also shows validity of zakat computations 
in accordance with Islam (Abdullah et al., 
2011). However, since a number of Shariah-
compliant companies do not have Shariah 
supervisory boards, these companies are 
not expected to have such a report. Muslim 
decision makers are interested in the report 
of the Shariah supervisory board because 
it is issued by a third party. A Shariah-
compliant company should also disclose 
information about the Shariah supervisory 
board’s members such as their names, age, 
and qualifications. Muslim decision makers 
could be interested in these details to assure 
whether the board members are among the 
top Islamic scholars. 
5) Ownership structure
This category consists two information 
items: number of Muslim shareholders 
and amount of shares owned by Muslim 
shareholders. Shariah-compliant companies 
should disclose such information to 
demonstrate transparency and full disclosure 
in accordance with the Islamic perspective.
 
Scoring the disclosure items and index
Each disclosure item was given equal 
weight in the index, consistent with prior 
disclosure studies. Information items could 
have been weighted based on their perceived 
importance.  However, equal weighting was 
preferred to avoid the subjectivity involved 
in assigning items’ weights of importance 
for different user groups (Cooke, 1991; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Barako et al., 
2006; Al-Shammari, 2008; Othman and 
Thani, 2010). In addition, prior studies have 
argued that the results of the equal weighting 
procedure tend to be similar to those of 
other weighting systems (Firth, 1979; Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987; Zarzeski, 1996; 
Prencipe, 2004).
Each disclosure item scored one if disclosed 
and zero if not, although no penalty was 
imposed if the item was considered irrelevant. 
To ensure that the judgment of relevancy 
was not biased, the following procedure was 
undertaken. First, the entire annual report 
was read carefully before scoring to enable 
the researcher to understand the nature and 
complexity of each company’s operations 
and to form an opinion on whether 
undisclosed items obviously applied to the 
company. Second, an independent faculty 
member coded the checklists. Inter-rater 
agreement was 97% and all disagreements 
were resolved via discussion between the 
two coders. This is consistent with prior 
voluntary disclosure studies. The scores 






final score for each company. The voluntary 
Islamic social responsibility disclosure 
index (ISRD) for each company was then 
calculated as the ratio of total actual items 
disclosed to the maximum possible item 
score applicable to that company. This 
approach has been followed by the majority 
of disclosure studies. Specifically, consistent 
with Sulaiman et al. (2011) and Halil et al. 
(2011), the following formula was used to 
compute the disclosure score:
ISRD = Total actual items disclosed 
     by the financial institution / 
     Maximum possible score applicable to 
     the institution
The independent variables
Data for all independent variables were 
obtained from the annual reports and the 
2010 Companies Guide published by 
the KSE. Table 1 below summarizes the 
independent variables and their proxies. 
Corporate governance variables were 
measured consistent with prior corporate 
governance literature (Farook et al. 2011; 
Rouf, 2011; Huafangm and Jianguo, 2007; 
Ho and Wong, 2001).
This study used total assets to measure 
company size because it is a common 
measure in prior studies (e.g., Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Luo, et al., 2006; Farook et 
al., 2011; Rouf, 2011). For auditor type, a 
dummy variable (Big 4 audit international 
firms vs. non Big 4 audit international 
firms) is used consistent with the majority 
of previous studies (e.g., Al-Shammari and 
Al-Sultan, 2010; Makhija and Patton, 2004; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Inchausti, 1997). 
Table 1: Summary of the independent variables and their proxies
Variable Acronym Proxy 
Shariah supervisory 
board
SSB Dummy variable coded 1 if a company has a Shariah 
supervisory board and 0 otherwise
Number of board 
members
BMEM Number of board members
Non-executive 
directors on the board
NONEX The proportion of non-executive members to total 
number of members on the board
Role duality DUAL Dummy variable coded 1 if the chairman is also the 
CEO and 0 otherwise
Company size CSIZE Natural log of total assets
Profitability PROFIT Return on equity = net profit/total shareholders’ 
equity
Ownership structure OWNER Number of shares owned by shareholders that own 
less than 5% of the shares/number of outstanding 
shares at year end
Auditor AUDIT Dummy variable coded 1 if a company has a local 
auditor with international affiliation (Big Four) 







This study measured profitability as return 
on equity consistent with prior studies (Luo 
et al., 2006; Al-Shayeb; 2003; Naser et al., 
2002; Malone et al., 1993).
Measure of ownership structure is 
constrained by available information. In 
Kuwait, according to KSE Law No. 2 of 
1999, shareholders in listed companies are 
required to publish their share ownership 
when it reaches at least 5% of the 
outstanding shares of a company. It appears 
that three shareholders groups typically 
have substantial ownership in companies 
listed on the KSE (Al-Shammari et al., 
2008). These groups are the government 
and its agencies, institutional investors, 
and dominant families. These groups are 
considered insiders because they usually 
have representatives on the companies’ 
boards of directors; thereby, they have better 
access to internal information (Al-Shammari 
et al., 2008). Kuwaiti listed companies only 
reveal the identity and proportion of shares 
held by these groups. Therefore, the number 
of shares owned by shareholders that own 
less than 5% (outsiders) can be calculated 
by eliminating the number of shares owned 
by these groups. 
Statistical method
This study uses a multivariate regression 
model because the model can examine 
the effects of all independent variables 
simultaneously on the dependent variable. 
Therefore, it has been used by prior 
disclosure studies. The following model 
jointly tested the study’s hypotheses: 
where ISRD = the Islamic social 
responsibility disclosure index scores for 
sampled companies and j =  jth company.
VII. RESuLTS
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure index 
is reported in Table 2 below. The table 
indicates that the average level of Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure in Shariah-
compliant financial companies is 18% (that 
is, companies disclose on average 18% of 
possible voluntary disclosure items). This is 
higher than found by Farook et al. (2011) 
(17%) and Maali et al. (2003) (13%). The 
Islamic disclosure of this study is higher 
than that in prior studies because the sample 
is from one country, whereas the samples 
of the other studies were from different 
countries. It is lower than found by Halil 
et al. (2011) (94%) and Sulaiman et al. 
(2011) (51%). This is due to the fact that 
these studies investigated compliance with 
Islamic disclosure in Malaysia in which 
Islamic disclosure is mandatory based on 
guidelines issued by the BNM, the standard 
on corporate governance promulgated by 
the AAOIFI, and the framework introduced 
by the IFSB. However, the mean level of 
Islamic social responsibility disclosure in 
Kuwait is low because over 80% of the 
items that could be disclosed voluntarily 
remain undisclosed. The low amount of 
disclosure in this study could be because 
there is no Islamic disclosure requirement 
in place and regulators and the public do 
not encourage or create pressure for more 
Islamic disclosure. 
Based on these findings, 
the Islamic perspective of 















not fulfilled and the society may not be able 
to know the operational effects of a company 
on societal well-being, or to judge whether 
a company is compliant with Shariah 
principles. Muslim decision makers may be 
unable to properly assess the compliance of 
a company with Shariah principles, therefore 
affecting their spiritual needs and religious 
duties. Lack of voluntary disclosure by 
companies could be attributed to the absence 
of encouragement and pressure from both 
the public and shareholders.
Table 2 shows the minimum and maximum 
percentages of Islamic disclosure. The 
minimum and maximum for Islamic 
disclosure items were 4% and 52%, 
respectively. Only one company disclosed 
the minimum, and only two companies 
disclosed the maximum. There was one 
Islamic item disclosed frequently by all the 
Shariah-compliant financial companies: 
a statement of compliance with Shariah 
principles. This study also found Islamic 
items not disclosed, including Gharar and 
value-added statements. These differences 
in the levels of voluntary Islamic social 
responsibility disclosure could be attributed 
to corporate governance characteristics. 
With respect to the independent variables, 
there is a wide range of variation within 
the sample, as indicated by the minimum 
and maximum values in Table 2. The study 
found that Shariah supervisory boards 
existed in 22 companies (55%), whereas 
other companies in the sample only 
declared a statement of compliance with 
Shariah principles. This may suggest that 
Shariah-compliant financial companies rely 
on Shariah supervisory boards to assess 
compliance with Shariah law. 
Dependent Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Islamic social responsibility disclosure 
(ISRD)
0.18 0.09 0.04 0.52
Independent variables
Shariah supervisory board (SSB) 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
Number of board members (BMEM) 5.00 0.20 3.00 11.00
Non-executive directors on the board 
(NONEX)
0.82 0.11 0.09 1.00
Role duality (DUAL) 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00
Company size (CSIZE) (KD million)* 231.00 389.00 77.41 3176.40
Profitability (PROFIT) 0.30 0.19 -0.08 0.70
Ownership structure (OWNER) 0.31 0.21 0.29 0.59
Auditor (Audit) 0.60 0.48 0.00 1.00
*One $US = 0.305 Kuwait Dinar (KD). The voluntary Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure index was calculated as the ratio of the total actual items disclosed divided 
by the maximum possible item score applicable to that company.  For definition of 
the independent variables, see Table 1.






The mean for the number of board members 
was 5 members with a minimum of 3 and a 
maximum of 11 members. For the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board, the 
mean was 82% with a minimum of 9% and 
a maximum of 100%.  This indicates that 
boards seem to include more non-executive 
directors than executives. 
The percentage of 100% 
indicates that all members 
on the board are non-
executives. For role duality, 
the results show that the 
mean was 42%, indicating 
that 16 companies have role 
duality. 
For continuous control 
variables in Table 2, total 
assets (company size 
measure), for example, has 
considerable dispersion in 
the scores, as represented by the minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation. For the 
categorical control variables, 24 Shariah-
compliant financial companies were audited 
by a local audit firm affiliated with one of 
the Big Four international audit firms, and 
16 were clients of local audit firms not 
affiliated with one of the Big Four. 
Before conducting regression analysis, 
multicollinearity was tested. One reason 
for doing this is to indicate whether 
multicollinearity could cause estimation 
problems. Table 3 below contains a Pearson 
correlation matrix for the continuous 
variables. The table also shows that the 
highest correlation coefficient was 0.222 
(between number of board members and 
ownership structure). As a result, it is not 
sufficient to impair the regression results 
since the pair-wise correlation coefficients 
are less than 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003). 
However, another method widely used 
to detect multicollinearity is the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). This is reported in 
Table 4 in the next subsection. Since VIF did 
not exceed 10 for any variable in any model, 
it was concluded that collinearity was not a 
serious problem (Neter et al., 1983).
Analysis of regression results
This study is concerned with the association 
between a number of corporate governance 
characteristics and the extent of Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure in the annual 
reports of 40 Shariah-compliant financial 
companies listed on the KSE in 2010. Table 
4 below presents the regression results. 
The model is statistically significant at 
the 1% level and the adjusted R squared 
(Adj R2) suggests that 31% of the Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure variation 
is explained by the independent variables. 
However, this indicates that variables not 
included in the model may explain the 
variation in Islamic disclosure. The R2 (adj.) 
was lower than in some prior studies: 39% 
was found by Farook et al. (2011) and higher 
than 25% was found by Ousama and Fatima 
(2010). The results showed that the level of 
Table 3: Pearson correlation coefficients of continuous 
independent variables
BMEM NONEX CSIZE PROFIT
NONEX 0.154**
CSIZE 0.092 -0.078
PROFIT 0.207**  0.124 0.213**
OWNER 0.222**  0.114** 0.211 0.035
** Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). For definitions of 






Islamic social responsibility disclosure was 
associated with the existence of a Shariah 
supervisory board, role duality, company 
size, and profitability. The remaining 
independent variables (number of board 
members, proportion of non-executive 
directors, ownership structure, and auditor) 
were not significant. These findings lend 
support to hypotheses H1 and H4. 
The results also show that a Shariah 
supervisory board was positively associated 
with the level of Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure. These results are consistent with 
Farook et al. (2011) and Halil et al. (2011). 
This study provides evidence that the Shariah 
supervisory board explains voluntary Islamic 
disclosure and plays a role in promoting 
voluntary Islamic disclosure in the annual 
reports of Shariah-compliant financial 
companies. This in turn assures Muslim 
shareholders and society that the board has 
monitored transactions and activities and 





Shariah supervisory board SSB (+) 0.094 +++ 1.912
Number of board members BMEM (+) 0.051 1.129
Non-executive directors on the board NONEX (+) -0.012 1.112
Role duality DUAL (-) -0.010 + 1.192
Company size CSIZE (+) 0.140 +++ 1.431
Profitability PROFIT (+) 0.081 ++ 1.264
Ownership structure OWNER (+) -0.021 1.357




Prob. (F) < 0.001
No. of companies 40
+++ t test (one-tailed) significant p < 0.01; ++ t test (one-tailed) significant p < 0.05;    + 
t test (one-tailed) significant p < 0.10, ** t test (two-tailed) significant p < 0.05.      For 
definitions of the independent variables, see Table 1.
checked whether they were in compliance 
with Shariah law. It is also possible that the 
existence of the Shariah supervisory board 
fulfills the Islamic ideal of full disclosure by 
putting pressure on management to disclose 
information to enable Muslim shareholders 
and society to make religious decisions.
Role duality was negatively associated with 
the level of Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure. A possible interpretation of this 
result is that a single individual acting as 
both the CEO and chairman of the board 
impairs the board’s monitoring and leads 
to opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
CEO. Consequently, the CEO would tend to 
withhold unfavorable information in general 
and Islamic disclosure in particular from 
shareholders. It can be concluded that that 
the Islamic ideal of full disclosure and social 
accountability may not be fulfilled with the 






Company size was positively associated 
with voluntary Islamic disclosure. This 
suggests that larger Shariah-compliant 
financial companies disclose more Islamic 
information than smaller companies 
because they may become more involved 
with society and want to discharge their 
accountability to society and stakeholders, 
particularly Muslim stakeholders. The 
findings are consistent with Farook et al. 
(2011) and Ousama and Fatima (2010). 
Profitability was also positively associated 
with the level of Islamic disclosure. A 
possible interpretation for this result is 
that managers of larger profitable Shariah-
compliant financial companies disclose 
more voluntary information to display 
their actions and signal their success to all 
shareholders and society. Those managers 
wish to show society and the public that their 
transactions and activities are in compliance 
with Shariah principles. 
VIII. SuMMARY AND 
CONCLuSIONS
This study sought to examine in an empirical 
way the relationship between a number 
of corporate governance characteristics 
and the extent of voluntary Islamic social 
responsibility disclosure. The data source 
was the annual reports of 40 Shariah-
compliant financial companies listed on 
the KSE in 2010. The extent of voluntary 
Islamic social responsibility disclosure 
was measured in cross-section using a self-
disclosure index. This index consists of 46 
Islamic information items. A multivariate 
regression analysis was employed to test the 
associations between the level of voluntary 
Islamic social responsibility disclosure and 
the corporate governance characteristics.
Results showed that voluntary Islamic 
social responsibility disclosure by Shariah-
compliant financial companies is 18%. 
This is higher than that found by Farook 
et al. (2011) (17%) and Maali et al. (2003) 
(13%) but lower than that found by Halil 
et al. (2011) (94%) and Sulaiman et al. 
(2011) (51%). However, the mean level 
of Islamic social responsibility disclosure 
in Kuwait is low; over 80% of the items 
that could be disclosed voluntarily remain 
undisclosed. The low amount of disclosure 
in this study could be because there is no 
Islamic disclosure requirement in place and 
regulators and the public do not encourage or 
create pressure for more Islamic disclosure. 
This finding suggests that the Islamic ideal 
of full disclosure and social accountability 
was not fulfilled, the operational effects of 
a company on societal well-being are not 
clear, and society is unable to judge whether 
a company was compliant with Shariah 
principles. Muslim decision makers could 
be unable to assess a company’s compliance 
with Shariah principles, thereby affecting 
their spiritual needs and religious duties. 
The results of multivariate analysis indicate 
that the level of Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure was positively associated with 
the existence of a Shariah supervisory 
board, company size, and profitability, but 
negatively with role duality, Other variables 
were insignificant. The Shariah supervisory 
board was positively associated because 
companies with such boards may have 
done more monitoring of transactions and 
activities and checking of whether they were 
in compliance with Shariah law. Role duality 
was negatively associated because a single 
individual in charge impairs the board’s 
monitoring and leads to opportunistic 






tend to withhold unfavorable information in 
general and Islamic disclosure in particular 
from shareholders.
Company size was positively associated 
with voluntary Islamic disclosure. This 
suggests that larger Shariah-compliant 
financial companies disclose more Islamic 
information than smaller ones because they 
may become more involved with society 
and want to demonstrate their accountability 
to society and stakeholders, particularly 
Muslim ones. Profitability was also 
positively associated with the level of Islamic 
disclosure. Managers of larger profitable 
Shariah-compliant financial companies 
disclose more voluntary information to 
demonstrate their actions to all shareholders 
and society. These managers wish to show 
that their transactions and activities are in 
compliance with Shariah principles. 
This study extends the limited Kuwaiti 
literature in the area of corporate governance 
and voluntary Islamic disclosure by Shariah-
compliant financial companies. It also fills a 
gap for empirical studies on the impact of 
corporate governance on Shariah-compliant 
financial companies’ disclosure practices. 
This study is important for enhancing our 
understanding of corporate disclosure by 
Shariah-compliant companies in Islamic 
nations in general and Kuwait in particular. 
It seeks to explain why some Shariah-
complaint financial companies disclose more 
Islamic information than others, given the 
absence of any Islamic regulation compelling 
companies to disclose such information. It 
also explores the determinants of corporate 
governance that enable the explanation of 
voluntary Islamic disclosure. 
Several limitations should be noted. First, 
this study is limited to a single period data. 
It uses only annual reports from 2010. 
Future research could extent this study over 
longer period data. Such studies may help 
to validate the conclusions of this study and 
overcome the possibility that a single period 
data set may bias the results. In spite of this 
limitation, the results of this study provide a 
useful insight into the social responsibility 
disclosure by Shariah-compliant financial 
companies in Kuwait and provided a starting 
point for future research. 
Second, the model explained 31% of Islamic 
disclosure variation with independent 
variables. Although this explained a 
significant part of the variation, there is 
still a material part unexplained, which 
represents the “noise” in the model. Data 
availability limited the ability to study some 
factors that have been found to be important 
theoretically or empirically in other 
disclosure studies (e.g. share ownership 
by Muslims and educational qualifications 
of members of the board). As additional 
information regarding Kuwaiti Shariah-
compliant financial companies becomes 
available, the effects of such factors should 
be investigated. 
Third, this study is limited to only one 
source of information: annual reports. 
Other disclosures that companies provide 
were beyond the scope of this study. 
Future studies should investigate the level 
of voluntary Islamic social responsibility 
disclosure through alternative media, such 
as the financial press, analyst meetings, 
stock market announcements, conference 






Fourth, this study assumes that disclosure 
items have the same weight, and that 
Shariah-compliant financial companies are 
disclosing the most important information 
selected. A survey focusing on various 
annual report user groups might provide 
further insight into the reliability of this 
assumption, especially in the case of 
Kuwait.
Fifth, this study was undertaken before 
the establishment of the SAC of the CMA 
on January 1, 2012. Future studies should 
replicate this study to assess any differences 
after the existence of the Council. 
Finally, in the field of corporate disclosure in 
the Middle East, research should extend this 
study over a longer period, or alternatively 
involve comparative studies with other Arab 
countries such as Gulf Co-Operation Council 
(GCC) member states. Such studies should 
investigate changes in corporate voluntary 
disclosure across time, and compare potential 
variations in nations with disparate social, 
political, and economic systems. This will 
help validate the conclusions of this study 
and overcome the possibility that a small, 
single-period study biases results.
The findings of this study have important 
implications for lawmakers, preparers 
of financial statements, and existing and 
potential investors (Muslim and non-
Muslim). The findings provide evidence 
that Shariah-complaint companies lack 
meaningful voluntary disclosure, especially 
for Islamic disclosure information. As a 
result, the CMA (lawmakers) may use 
the findings to suggest areas for further 
concentrated efforts.  The aims would be to 
ensure information adequacy and increased 
efficiency of rapidly developing capital 
markets and improvement of the disclosure 
regulatory practices by Shariah-compliant 
financial companies in Kuwait. 
The CMA may also use this information to 
evaluate the current corporate governance 
requirements and their effects on disclosure. 
The CMA should not allow companies to 
have role duality. Given the importance of 
Shariah-compliant financial companies, the 
CMA should be particularly concerned with 
issues related to disclosure, specifically of 
Islamic information. More specifically, 
the CMA should be more concerned with 
the disclosure needs of users of financial 
companies with no Shariah supervisory 
board in place, companies with role duality, 
and smaller, less profitable Shariah-
compliant financial companies. 
The Shariah supervisory boards in 
companies may use the findings to better 
communicate with stakeholders. This may 
assist in strengthening these boards in 
Kuwait. The findings are also useful when 
the preparers of financial statements strive 
to communicate with Muslim shareholders 
and investors. Stakeholders, e.g. Muslim 
investors may use the findings to better 
understand the disclosure behavior of 
Shariah-compliant companies in Kuwait. 
Such findings may assist them in diversifying 
their investment portfolios. The findings and 
limitations also have important implications 











1-1 information on Riba and Gharar
1 Riba (interest) activities
2 Amounts of expenses/revenue from riba transactions
3 Qualitative information on the prohibited transactions/activities
4 Amounts of profits or losses from the prohibited transactions other than riba (interest)
5 Qualitative information on Gharar
6 Quantitative information on Gharar
1-2 information on Zakat
7 Information on computation of Zakat
8 Amount of zakat fund
9 sources of zakat fund
10 Beneficiaries of zakat
11 The balance of zakat fund, and reasons for non-distribution
1-3 information on Saddaqa
12 Qualitative information on Saddaqa/Charitable donations
13 Quantitative of Saddaqa/Charitable donations
1-4 information on Waqf
14 Qualitative information on Waqf
15 Quantitative of Waqf
1-5 information on other social responsibility
16 Current Value Balance Sheet (CVBS)
17 Value Added Statement (VAS)
18 How such amounts are to disposed off
19 Qualitative information on debts written off
20 Quantitative information on debts written off
1-6 information on activities towards the society
21 Qualitative information on the contribution towards the society programs 
22 Amounts of the contribution towards the society programs
2- Employee information
23 Corporate policy on equal opportunities
24 Employment of other special-needs-group (i.e. handicapped)
25 Employment of other special-interest-group (i.e. ex-convicts, former drug-addicts)
26 Qualitative of benevolent loan to employees (qard hasan)
27 Quantitative of benevolent loan to employees (qard hasan)
28 Higher echelons in the company perform the congregational prayers with lower and middle 
level managers
29 Muslim employees are allowed to perform their obligatory prayers during specific times and 
fasting during Ramadhan on their working day
30 Proper place of worship for the employees
3- Corporate governance
3-1 Report of the board of directors
31 Declaration about compliance with Shariah rules and principles






33 Reasons for engagement in prohibited transactions
34 The amount of revenue or expenses from prohibited transactions
35 Information on forbidden activities: monopolistic practice, hoarding necessary goods, price 
manipulation, fraudulent business practice, and gambling
36 Anti-corruption policies
3-2 Shariah supervisory board
37 Report of Shariah supervisory board
38 Name of the Shariah supervisory board
39 Age of the Shariah supervisory board
40 Educational qualifications
Experience of the Shariah supervisory board 
41 Other company’s supervisory board held by member board of the Shariah supervisory
42 The Shariah supervisory board’s remuneration
43 The Shariah supervisory Board’s view about the necessity of prohibited transactions/
activities
44 The Shariah supervisory Board’s opinion regarding validity of zakat’s computation
4- Ownership structure
45 Number of Muslim shareholders
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